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Abstract
Background: Functional neuroimaging studies have suggested activation of midline frontoparietal brain regions to be at
the core of self-related processes. However, although some studies reported involvement of the insula, little attention has
been paid to this region as forming part of the ‘‘self’’-network.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we aimed at replicating and
extending previous studies by scanning subjects whilst reflecting upon their own personal qualities as compared to those of
an acquaintance. A third condition with statements about general knowledge was used to control for attention, semantic
processing and decision making processes. The results showed a significant effect of task in brain activity, consistent with
previous findings, by which both person conditions recruited a common set of medial prefrontal and posterior regions, yet
significant differences between self and other were found in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC). Notably, significant neural activation in the left anterior insula was observed as uniquely associated with self-
reflection.
Conclusions/Significance: The results provide further evidence for the specific recruitment of anterior MPFC and ACC
regions for self-related processing, and highlight a role for the insula in self-reflection. As the insula is closely connected with
ascending internal body signals, this may indicate that the accumulation of changes in affective states that might be implied
in self-processing may contribute to our sense of self.
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Introduction
The study of the neural substrates of self-related processing has
become an increasingly prominent issue in cognitive neuroscience.
Recent functional neuroimaging studies have consistently shown
brain activity within several cortical regions during self-referential
tasks, particularly along the midline and including the prefrontal
cortex (PFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and parietal
regions. Moreover, these regions appear to be involved across a
variety of task domains, namely self-reflection [1,2], encoding and
retrieval of self-related information [3–6], self-related processing in
sexual arousal [7], assessment of one’s own personality and
physical traits [8–11], self-referential decision-making [12], and
first-person perspective taking [13]. Critically, these relevant
regions for social cognition strikingly overlap with the neural
substrates of the so-called ‘‘default mode’’ of the human brain
[14]. In this regard, the accumulating evidence for the existence of
a default mode of brain function has derived from the observation
of intrinsic activity in a neural architecture encompassing regions
of the MPFC, PCC and medial precuneus [15], whose interaction
would be intimately involved in self-awareness and conscious
experience [16–18].
Efforts to closely examine neural activity associated with self-
referential as opposed to other-person processing have described
activity in MPFC, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), supplementary
motor area (SMA) and precuneus for self versus a famous other
[2,9,11], ventral MPFC for self versus a similar or dissimilar other
[19], and superior medial parietal and MPFC for self versus a
friend [4,20]. Recently, functional magnetic resonance (fMRI)
evidence was examined in a meta-analysis by Northoff et al. [21],
which concluded in favor of a neural module of cortico-subcortical
midline structures underlying self-processing. Conversely, a
thorough review of the available behavioral and physiological
evidence of the possible specificity of a sense of self postulated that
the observation of brain activations associated with self-processing
might not be indicative of neural specificity due to methodological
irregularities such as the use of inadequate control conditions (e.g.,
lack of another person condition; the use of baseline conditions
based on case judgments, requiring a dissimilar cognitive process).
Instead of indicating self-relatedness, the authors proposed that
such activations would rather be attributable to generally
processing information about people [22].
The insular cortex is well known for its role in interoceptive
awareness and appraisal of one’s own internal states [23].
Furthermore, this structure has been involved in studies employing
affective tasks, being traditionally associated with pain [24]. The
insular cortex expands bilaterally along the innermost parts of the
human forebrain, being neuroanatomically plausible to distinguish
between the anterior and posterior portions. The anterior insula,
corresponding to the agranular cortex, is thought to be involved in
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processes reported insula activity [10,12,17,26–30], yet little
elaboration was made of such finding. Hence, the present study
placed special emphasis on whether the anterior insula would have
a role in a more general and in principle non-emotion-eliciting
self-reflection task.
Understanding the neural regions supporting self-reflection, a
crucial component of self-awareness, could be critical to elucidate
the intrinsic brain mechanisms whose impairment may lead to
psychological disturbances [31]. Impaired self-awareness is a
common feature in several neurologic [32–34] and psychiatric
disorders, such as schizophrenia [35,36], in which prefrontal and
cingulate regions are frequently compromised [37]. Interestingly,
recent findings suggest that impairments in the default mode
network may also be associated with psychiatric disorders [38].
The aim of this study was two-fold: 1) to clarify whether insula
activity would be intrinsically involved in self-reflection, and 2) to
replicate and expand current understanding of the neural network
underlying self-reflection using an fMRI task previously associated
with robust activity in midline structures [1]. Considering that
Johnson and colleagues’ study [1] used a semantic baseline, and
was therefore prone to criticism [22], we sought to address this
issue by adding an other-person reflection condition.
Based on previous data, we hypothesized that: 1) both person
conditions (compared to the semantic baseline) would show some
common activation patterns in prefrontal and parietal regions
[5,11,20]; 2) self-reflection (compared to other-reflection) would
still produce unique activations within the cortical midline,




Sixteen right-handed, healthy university students (10 male, aged
18–27 years; M=20.8 years, SD=2.5) participated in the study.
Subjects did not have a history of psychiatric or neurological
disorder, significant physical illness, head injury, or alcohol/drug
abuse. None of the subjects were taking alcohol or medication at
the time of the study. All subjects scored below cut-off on self-
reports of depression [39] (M=2.13, SD=2.05), and psychosis-
proneness [40], (M=1.12, SD=0.04). These tests were used to
rule out interfering factors associated with psychopathology that
may affect self-awareness [41]. After subjects were given a
complete explanation of the study, written informed consent was
obtained from all of them. Participants were paid for their
participation. The study was approved by the Medical Ethical
Committee of the University Medical Center Groningen, and was
conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Task
Subjects viewed three types of short sentences about personal
qualities, attributes and attitudes. They were asked to indicate
whether the sentence was true about them, whether it was true
about an acquaintance of theirs, or whether it was true about
general knowledge. Before scanning, a detailed explanation of the
task was given to all subjects and they were asked to choose an
acquaintance upon whom they were to reflect inside the scanner.
An eligible acquaintance was defined as someone familiar to the
degree of being able to judge some of their personality and
physical traits, but not too close and not eliciting strong feelings in
them. Thus, best friends, parents or romantic partners were not
permitted; instead, an acquaintance such as a classmate or a
teammate was suggested.
Procedure
The experiment comprised 90 trials, 30 per condition, including
items such as, for the Self condition, ‘‘I am a good friend’’, ‘‘I often
forget important things’’, ‘‘I am attractive’’, ‘‘I am good at my
studies’’. Sentences in the Other condition involved, for example,
‘‘OTHER can be trusted’’, ‘‘OTHER is a generous person’’,
‘‘OTHER is not very attractive’’, ‘‘OTHER often talks too
much’’. The Semantic condition (baseline) included sentences such
as ‘‘You need water to live’’, ‘‘A vertebra is a bone’’, ‘‘A hand has
8 fingers’’, ‘‘Spring comes after Autumn’’. There were an equal
number of true/false items in the semantic condition (50% of
each), and of physical/personality traits in both person conditions
(27% physical, 73% personality-related) so that results would not
be confounded by this effect. Similarly, there were the same
number of positive and negative key-words in the two person-
related sets of sentences (50% of each), validated against
Anderson’s list of personality trait words [42], in order to control
for a possible effect of valence on brain activity. Subjects
responded to each statement, presented in white letters on a black
screen, with a ‘‘yes’’ (right hand, index finger) or ‘‘no’’ (right hand,
middle finger) button-press response. A constant visual reminder of
which button to press was displayed at the bottom of the screen
throughout the entire scanning session.
The experimental design consisted of 5 blocks for each of the 3
conditions (Self, Other, Semantic), interleaved with four 20-s rest
periods consisting of a fixation cross presented in the middle of the
screen (at the beginning, middle and end of experiment). Order of
presentation of the 3 conditions was randomized. In each 24-s block,
6 different sentences of the same type were presented for 4 s each.
The experiment was executed on a Pentium PC using the
software package E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools Inc.,
Pittsburgh, PA). Stimuli were projected onto a screen positioned
at the end of the bore, visible through a mirror attached to the
head-coil. Cushions were used to minimize head movement.
Imaging data acquisition
Images were acquired with a 3T Philips Intera MR-scanner
(Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands). Functional data
comprised 246 volumes acquired with T2*-weighted gradient echo
planar imaging (EPI) sequences, using a sense-8 head coil. Thirty-
seven echo planar images per volume sensitive to blood
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast were obtained
(TR=2000 ms; TE=35 ms; 3.563.5 mm in-plane resolution;
Field of View [FOV], 224 mm). Slices were acquired interleaved
and oriented parallel to the AC-PC plane, with a thickness of
3.5 mm and no gap. High-resolution T1-weighted 3D fast-field
echo (FFE) sequences were obtained for anatomical reference (160
slices; TR, 25 ms; TE, 4.6 ms; slice-thickness, 1 mm; matrix,
2566256; FOV 26 cm; voxel size, 16161 mm).
Imaging data analyses
The fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using SMP5
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK)
implemented in Matlab 7.1 (The Mathwork Inc.). All functional
images were slice-time corrected, and realigned. After realign-
ment, the obtained mean EPI image was co-registered with the
structural T1 image. Subsequently, images were spatially normal-
ized to the standard stereotactic space defined by the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) template. During normalization,
scans were re-sampled onto a 26262m m
3 grid. Functional
images were spatially smoothed with a 3D isotropic Gaussian
kernel (FWHM of 8 mm). Low-frequency noise was removed by
applying a high-pass filter (cut-off of 128 s) to the fMRI time-series
at each voxel. Significant hemodynamic changes for each
The Insula and Self-Reflection
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a blocked (epoch) design modeled using a boxcar function
convoluted with a hemodynamic response function. Statistical
parametric maps for each contrast of the t-statistic were calculated
on a voxel-by-voxel basis for each subject (first-level analysis on
Self.Semantic and Other.Semantic).
The contrast images obtained per subject were entered as the
data for the second-level (group) analyses. In order to examine
significant brain activation in each effect, we used a one-way
within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA). One experimental
factor was specified, with two levels (Self.Semantic, Other.Se-
mantic). Peak coordinates were identified at p,0.05, False
Discovery Rate corrected (FDR), in regions encompassing at least
10 voxels. After determining the main effect of task, we examined
differences between self and other, by means of a t-test between the
two levels (e.g., [self.semantic].[other.semantic]), setting the




Reaction times (RT) during the Self (M=1917 ms), Other
(M=1986 ms), and Semantic conditions (M=1937 ms) did not
differ significantly from each other (F(2, 45)=0.318; p=0.729).
This was considered as indicative that none of the three conditions
might have required a superior cognitive effort, which enabled a
clearer interpretation of results.
No significant differences were found when examining the
proportion of the participants’ attribution of positive qualities to
self or to other (F(1,30)=0.119; p=0.773). All subjects scored
above 90% correct in the semantic condition (M=28.19,
SD=1.11, maximum: 30).
Functional imaging results
The within-subjects analysis revealed that there was a main
effect of task in the precuneus extending into the superior parietal
lobe, in the ACC, and bilaterally in the middle frontal and
superior frontal gyri (MPFC). Additional activations were seen in
the superior temporal gyrus (STG), calcarine gyrus, SMA, and the
left anterior insula (Table 1 and Figure 1).
The t-test analysis between the two levels ([self.semanti-
c].[other.semantic]) indicated that the Self condition produced
significant neural activation in ACC, middle and superior frontal
gyri (MPFC), STG, SMA, and the left anterior insula. In addition,
brain activity was seen in the calcarine gyrus, and the cerebellum.
(Table 2 and Figure 2).
Table 1. Neural activation produced by the main effects of
task.
Region L/R MNI Coordinates F-value Z-score
xyz
Anterior Cingulate Cortex L 28 28 28 29.56 4.35
R 6 28 28 28.31 4.28
Middle Frontal Gyrus R 26 54 30 25.09 4.08
L 224 52 32 17.85 3.53
Superior Frontal Gyrus R 20 52 36 22.80 3.92
L 224 50 22 21.14 3.80
Precuneus R 4 262 32 62.53 5.65
Calcarine Gyrus R 14 288 0 42.48 4.97
Superior Temporal Gyrus L 66 240 18 18.10 3.55
SMA R 8 10 62 17.03 3.46
Insula L 236 20 4 15.87 3.35
SMA=Supplementary Motor AreaActivations were identified with a t-test
between [self.semantic].[other.semantic], and vice-versa. Significance was
set at p,0.05 (FDR corrected), encompassing at least 10 voxels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004618.t001
Figure 1. Glass brain and rendered view depicting the main effect of task, as characterized with a one-way within-subjects ANOVA.
Significant differences were recognized at p,0.05 (FDR corrected) and extent threshold of 10 voxels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004618.g001
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analysis ([other.semantic].[self.semantic]) showed a significant
effect in the right precuneus, and the right superior parietal lobe.
(Table 2 and Figure 3).
In sum, Self-reflection significantly explained brain activity in a
neural architecture comprising the left anterior insula, MPFC and
ACC, along with temporal and occipital regions.
Finally, we examined the effects of interest in these regions in
order to ascertain the direction of these associations. These
contrasts revealed that, at p,0.05 (FDR corrected), the significant
difference in insula activation was produced by Self rather than
Other (F(3,30)=4.625; p=0.040). As for the MPFC, ACC, and
STG, we observed that activation in those regions significantly
increased when subjects engaged in self-reflection rather than
when they reflected upon an acquaintance or upon general
knowledge (right MPFC, F(1,30)=6.484, p=0.016; left MPFC,
F(1,30)=4.904, p=0.035; ACC, F(1,30)=7.591, p=0.010; STG,
F(1,30)=5.388, p=0.027) (Figure 4). Finally, variability in the
precuneus was greater during the Other person condition
(F(1,30)=9.827; p=0.004).
Discussion
This study investigated whether the extent to which self-
reflection modulates brain activity could be dissociable from
reflecting upon an acquaintance and upon general semantic
knowledge, with special focus on the involvement of the insular
cortex. The analysis revealed self-related activity in a neural
architecture comprising the anterior MPFC and ACC. Notably,
the anterior insula showed unique activity associated with self-
reflection.
Particular interest was placed on the role of the insula in self-
reflection. The insular cortex is predominantly regarded as
associated with interoceptive awareness [23], emotional salience
[44], awareness over subjective feeling [45] and bodily arousal
states [46], and has been reported in self-referential tasks in the
emotional domain [21]. Given that the present experiment was
not designed to elicit explicit emotional feeling states (compared to,
e.g., studies employing emotional pictures), our results could
suggest a more general function of this area in self-referential
processing. Alternatively, considering its well-known role in
emotion [47], insular activity could actually be related to an
emotional component that might be inherent to self-processing; in
other words, to the self being an emotional entity per se. Indeed,
definitions of emotion emphasize that an emotion is caused by a
person consciously or unconsciously evaluating an event as
Table 2. Brain activation differentially associated with Self
and Other conditions.
Region L/R MNI coordinates T-score Z-score
xyz
Self-reflection
Anterior Cingulate Cortex L 28 28 28 5.44 4.50
R 6 28 28 5.32 4.43
Middle Frontal Gyrus R 26 54 30 5.01 4.24
L 224 52 32 4.22 3.71
Superior Frontal Gyrus R 20 52 36 4.77 4.09
L 224 50 22 4.60 3.97
Superior Temporal Gyrus R 66 240 18 4.25 3.73
SMA R 8 10 62 4.13 3.64
Insula L 236 20 4 3.98 3.54
Other-reflection
Precuneus R 4 262 32 7.91 5.77
Superior Parietal Lobe R 20 268 50 4.68 4.02
SMA=Supplementary Motor Area. Activations were identified with a t-test
between [self.semantic].[other.semantic], and vice-versa. Significance was
set at p,0.05 (FDR corrected), encompassing at least 10 voxels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004618.t002
Figure 2. Brain regions with significantly greater activation for Self-reflection, identified at p,0.05, FDR corrected, extent threshold
of at least 10 voxels. Activation in the insula is depicted in the sagittal view, plotting its differential activation as obtained with the t-test
conducted on the within-subjects design ([Self.Semantic].[Other.Semantic]). Bars depict variance loadings and 90% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004618.g002
The Insula and Self-Reflection
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 February 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 2 | e4618relevant to their concerns or goals [48,49]. Thus, evaluating one’s
own personal characteristics, as in the present self-reflection task,
would almost by definition involve emotion. In addition, as the
insula is closely connected with ascending internal body signals
[50], the accumulation of changes in affective states that might be
implied in self-processing may contribute to our sense of self.
Taken together, this evidence supports the notion that the insula is
a supramodal structure, involved in a myriad of processes closely
related to facilitating a sense of self. Disturbances in insula activity
may result in social and emotional impairments commonly
observed in psychopathology, as recently suggested by a study
showing differential insula involvement in the failure to maintain
adequate social interactions by people with Borderline Personality
Disorder [51].
The MPFC activity associated with self-processing aligns well
with prior research [1,4,5,7–9,11,12,19,29,52,53,54]. This study
was designed to provide an improvement for the limitations that
had been claimed from those previous studies [22]. The fact that
reaction times in the paradigm used herein were longer than in
studies using single trait adjectives [2,4,8,9,12,29] could indicate
that comparing self and other in terms of personal attitudes, traits
and attributes helped induce a more elaborate reflective process on
one’s own sense of self and identity. Hence, these data expand the
findings from Johnson et al. [1] by showing distinct recruitment of
the MPFC for self-reflection not only when compared to general
knowledge but also when controlling for the neural activity
associated with reflecting upon another person. Furthermore, the
MPFC is crucial in what has been proposed as a default mode of
self-evaluation [55], in which this region would support
automatic evaluation of self [17]. Beyond the evident overlap
between our findings and previous research in default mode
activity, the concurrent insula activation observed herein
expands prior knowledge on which regions within the human
forebrain are key players in self-awareness. Gusnard et al. [17]
reported left insula activity when subjects reflected upon their
emotional state, therefore supporting this area’s role in
emotional self-awareness. We showed that anterior insula activity
is associated with reflecting upon non-explicitly emotional
stimuli, suggesting its involvement in a distributed network of
neural regions, the activation of which is increased when
specifically attending to self-referential mental activity. Similarly,
self-reflection also induced differential ACC activity, which
aligns well with previous work [4,7,42,54,56–58], and is
suggestive of this area’s greater engagement for self- than for
other-person reflection.
The present report failed to replicate the findings from Johnson
et al. [1] of a specific involvement of the PCC in self-reflection.
However, their study did not use an other-person reflection
condition. In our study, the precuneus, a neighboring parietal
region to the PCC, did show a strong BOLD response as a main
effect of task, which aligns well with its role in representing person
characteristics [1,8–10,59]. These results may thus support the
involvement of posterior areas in perspective-taking [13] and
comparison processes [60], as subjects might have employed
comparison and simulation when reflecting upon an acquaintance.
Moreover, further testing confirmed that its activation was largely
explained by other-reflection. The precuneus involvement in self-
processing tasks has been related to its role in autobiographical
memory [16]. Thus, as a tentative explanation, the greater
precuneus activity for Other found in the present study might have
been induced by the subjects’ need to draw on autobiographical
memories about shared occasions in the past in order to judge the
acquaintance’s personal and physical attributes.
Finally, the STG was also recruited for self-reflection. The STG
has been described as important for social cognition, particularly
relevant in the Theory of Mind network [for review, see 61]. The
differential activation found in our experiment supports the notion
that brain regions involved in self-relatedness are also intrinsically
participative in social cognitive processes, in line with simulation
accounts [53,56].
This study could not control for social desirability, therefore
subjects could have been biased towards endorsing false responses
as veridical in order to give a better image of themselves. However,
it was emphasized to subjects before scanning that the experiment
was about thinking about their true characteristics, and that the
experimenters had no interest whatsoever in their personal
qualities. Unfortunately, the risk that subjects may respond with
a positive bias might be inherent to paradigms on self-relatedness
and social cognition. Nonetheless, we considered the fact that RTs
were not significantly longer for any of the three conditions as
indicative that no differential psychological process was interfering
with one specific condition (e.g., thinking about how I want to be
instead of how I am; increased uncertainty when judging person
attributes compared to general knowledge). Furthermore, subjects
did not attribute more positive items to themselves than to the
other person, which further confirmed that there was no apparent
Figure 3. Brain regions with significantly greater activation for Other-reflection, identified at p,0.05, FDR corrected, extent
threshold of at least 10 voxels. Activation in the precuneus is depicted in the sagittal view, plotting its differential activation as obtained with the
t-test conducted on the within-subjects design ([Other.Semantic].[Self.Semantic]). Bars depict variance loadings and 90% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004618.g003
The Insula and Self-Reflection
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 February 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 2 | e4618The Insula and Self-Reflection
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 February 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 2 | e4618interference of stimuli valence in brain response. In light of the
difficulty to rule out the possibility of untruthful responses, future
similar paradigms could benefit from the inclusion of a measure of
social desirability. Finally, the present study was not designed to
examine the distinction between physical and mental self on brain
activity. It is therefore possible that the results reported herein
reflect brain activity involved in processing personality character-
istics to a greater extent, since they were used more often.
However, both conditions comprised an equal number of both
types of traits, so that this would not affect the contrast between
Self and Other-reflection. Future studies specifically designed to
this end may help expand current knowledge on the cerebral areas
involved in reflecting upon different types of person characteristics.
In sum, the results from the present study shed new light on the
functional roles of the anterior insular cortex by showing its
involvement in self-reflection. Our results confirmed previous
evidence of a relative overlap within the neural systems subserving
Self- and Other-related processing (as shown by the main effect of
task), yet some independent regions for self-reflection were
identified – MPFC, ACC and anterior insula. Thus, rather than
merely reflecting general person-processing, as suggested before
[22], there is accumulating evidence for a set of anterior cortical
regions intimately involved in self-related processing. Future
research in schizophrenia and in disorders of emotion regulation
such as alexithymia [62] with a focus on these areas could help
determine the nature of the lack of awareness that is frequently
present in these disorders.
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